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Derived pension rights exist in most Social Security systems but with variable generosity. They 
are  mainly  targeted  towards  non-working  wives  and  widows  and  are  viewed  as  a  means  to 
alleviate poverty among older women living alone. The purpose of this paper is to explain how 
they can emerge from a political economy process when the Social Security is a combination of 
Bismarckian and Beveridgian pillars. It also shows that derived rights tend to encourage stay-at-
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Most OECD pension systems o⁄er protection for non-working widows and divorcees through
the so-called derived pension rights. Derived pension rights represent an important reality in
two ways. They ￿rst represent a non negligible part of Social Security spending and second they
contribute to poverty alleviation among elderly women living alone.1 The concept of derived
pension rights concern Social Security bene￿ts, which accrue to an individual but which originate
from and depend on their relationship with another person, usually of parenthood, marriage or
cohabitation. They most often concern women, widows, divorcees or even non-working wives.
To illustrate the type of derived pension rights we have in mind, let us take the case of
Belgian Social Security. The three main derived pension rights are (i) the survivors￿bene￿ts
for working or non-working widows (80% of the deceased￿ s pension plus own pension but the
combined amount cannot exceed more than 110% of own pension entitlement), (ii) the divorcees￿
pension bene￿ts (37.5% of a former spouse￿ s average earnings over the duration of marriage, less
their own pension rights accrued during the same period), (iii) the spousal bene￿ts which are
a form of dependents￿allowance and are usually provided as a supplement to the main pension
bene￿t (15% of the insured￿ s average lifetime earnings; indeed, the replacement ratio is 60% for
singles while it is 75% for couples).2 Note that besides these bene￿ts from derived rights, the
elderly is also entitled to a basic or targeted pension which is granted to all older persons who
did not earn enough pension entitlements.
In spite of their importance, derived pension rights are not a well-researched area of pension
system analysis. There are only a few studies and all of them are empirical. The focus is mostly
on gender inequality and on spouses as dependents or survivors, while the rights of dependent
children are largely excluded. Male dependents are also excluded from most analyses, re￿ ecting
their minimal share in total bene￿ciaries of derived pension rights. Most studies examine the
economic situation of elderly women living alone.3
A few articles also compare derived pension rights across countries and study how the eco-
1In France, in 2006, derived pension rights were estimated to represent 14% of total Social Security expenditure
(see les Comptes de la Protection Nationale, DREES, 2007). In Belgium, ￿gures are even bigger: for the same
year, spousal bene￿ts plus the survival bene￿ts amounted to 32% of the private sector pensions expenditures.
2These ￿gures are taken from Choi (2006).
3In the case of France, see for example, Bonnet et Houriez (2009a, b).
1nomic situation of women is modi￿ed after the death of a spouse. For example, Burkhauser et
al. (2005) show that, for the four countries under study (the US, Germany, Canada and Great
Britain), the change in the economic well-being of women following the death of their husband
is comparable, even though these countries have a di⁄erent mix of public and private pension
schemes; di⁄erences in outcomes are mostly related to the age at death of the spouse, the age
of the survivor and whether there are surviving children. Thompson and Carasso (2002) also
analyze pension bene￿ts of 16 countries from the perspective of women, including survivors￿
bene￿ts and pension rights in case of divorce. Unlike Burkhauser et al. (2005), these authors
￿nd that survivors￿bene￿ts mainly depend on the type of main pension schemes for workers, in
particular whether they are ￿ at rate or earnings-related. As for divorce, countries address this
issue in various ways: no bene￿t provision, pension splitting and creation of special bene￿ts.
Hurd and Wise (1997) show that a restructuring of pension bene￿ts in the US could have an
important e⁄ect on poverty of elderly women living alone. Poverty rates of widows could be
strongly reduced by an increase in survivor bene￿ts which would be funded by a reduction in the
bene￿ts of couples, even though this reduction could result in a small increase in the poverty rate
of couples. According to Choi (2006), in the OECD countries under study, non-working widows
and working widows receive an average pension level of 36 and 50% respectively, compared to
an average level for couples of nearly 60% of average earnings.
Most importantly for the purpose of our paper, the existence of such derived rights makes
the Social Security redistributes resources between individuals with di⁄erent marital status. As
it was shown by Galasso (2002), the magnitude of such redistribution is also surprisingly large.
For instance, one-earner couples get the highest internal return from the Social Security, followed
by two-earner couples with 70/30 earnings split; returns are equal for two-earner couples with
a 50/50 earnings split and single women, while single men are the most disadvantaged. The
di⁄erence in returns observed between singles and married couples, either one-earner or two-
earner, can be explained by the so-called ￿derived pension rights￿ . Several countries, like France,
provide the surviving spouse (more often the woman) with a survivor bene￿t, while some other
countries provide one-earner couples with a higher replacement rate than the one applied to
single men; some countries, like Belgium or Japan, provide both types of derived bene￿ts.4 The
marital status and the generosity of the system towards the non-working spouse is then likely
4For example, in Belgium, the supplementary pension is evaluated to 1/4 of the working spouse pension. As
shown in Gruber and Wise (1999), derived pension rights may take very di⁄erent forms depending on the country.
2to play an important role in the support for a pension system. This is the gist of our paper.
Unlike these empirical papers, ours is theoretical. Our objective is twofold. First, using a
political economy model in which individuals vote over the level of derived rights, we want to
identify the factors that are likely to in￿ uence the emergence of such rights but also what are the
consequences on the size and the generosity of the general pension system (either Beveridgian
or Bismarckian). Our intuition is that it should be related to the cost of housework, to the
potential wage of the non-working spouse but also to the characteristics of the welfare state
and to the political process we consider. Our second objective is to show that such a system,
whose primary goal is to give ￿nancial protection to non-working women and to the poorest
one-breadwinner couples, favours the existence of such couples and of stay-at-home women who
it intends to protect, as compared to a pure market economy situation. There is thus a trade-o⁄
between poverty alleviation and women￿ s labour participation.
To do so, we model a society composed of men and women who are part of either one-
or two-breadwinner couples.5 For simplicity, we assume away single individuals. Besides these
di⁄erences in the participation to the labour market, couples have also di⁄erent productivity. We
assume that there exists a pension system which is a combination of Bismarckian and Beveridgian
systems. This implies that such a system is partly contributive (individuals get a pension bene￿t
which is related to their previous contributions) and partly redistributive (the pension bene￿t
includes a ￿ at part). In addition, we assume that one-breadwinner couples bene￿t from derived
rights and that such rights account for both survivor bene￿ts and/or dependence allowances in
order to reduce poverty in these couples.6 We ￿rst characterize laissez-faire, ￿rst- and second-
best solutions as benchmarks but our objective is positive rather than normative. Hence, in
order to understand how the political process can favour the emergence of derived rights which
would supplement the existing Social Security system, we study the majority equilibrium one
observes in such a society. We assume that individuals vote on the level of derived rights while
the mix Beveridge-Bismarck is set at the constitutional level. At this level, the criterion chosen
is the Rawlsian maximin objective. Other speci￿cations could have been chosen for sure. Instead
of the two stages adopted here, ￿rst a normative one and then a positive one, we could have used
sequential voting or even simultaneous one. These two options are analytically more di¢ cult and
5For simplicity, we consider only heterosexual couples.
6There is no possibility of divorce and thus there is no divorcee derived pension bene￿t included in the derived
pension scheme.
3would not necessarily bring more interesting results. As to the Rawlsian criterion it is standard
at the constitutional level; it is in the spirit of Rawls￿view of the veil of ignorance. Here too
other options would have been possible at the cost of additional complexity.
Anticipating on the following we show that if the decisive voter is a one-breadwinner couple
a contributive pension system tends to be desirable as it implies less tax distortion than a
Beveridgian system. We also show that whether the decisive voter is a one breadwinner depends
on the opportunity cost of a second earner but also on the Bismarck-Beveridge mix.
This paper contributes to the literature on the political economy of pensions.7 In his seminal
contribution, Browning (1975) focused on age di⁄erences and showed that, if the old favour
generous pensions and the young prefer private savings, the decisive voter is the median age
one. More recent models include wage di⁄erences alongside age di⁄erences. In such a framework,
Casamatta et al. (2000) show that the pension system is chosen by a majority made of rich and
poor workers who collude against a coalition of retirees and middle-class workers: this is the
so-called ends against the middle outcome. We adopt a di⁄erent approach in the sense that we
claim that the marital situation and the labour force participation decisions inside couples also
a⁄ect the support for pension systems when they include spousal bene￿ts. In this respect, the
most closely related paper is the one by Leroux et al. (2010). In this paper, individuals di⁄er
according to two characteristics, gender and marriage. Also it is assumed that the partition of
the population between singles and couples and between one- and two-breadwinners is given and
that the pension system is purely Beveridgian. Further the size of derived rights is exogenous. It
is shown that the majority voting outcome depends on the relative number of one-breadwinner
couples and on the size of these derived rights. In contrast in the present paper, we assume
that the generosity of derived rights and wives￿labor participation are endogenous and as such
depend on policy instruments which agents vote on.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present our model.
In Section 3, we derive individuals￿decisions and the laissez faire. In section 4, we solve the
￿rst- and second-best optima. Section 5 solves the majority voting equilibrium assuming ￿rst a
discrete distribution of types and then a continuous distribution. Last section concludes.
7For good surveys, see Galasso and Profeta (2002) and de Walque (2005).
42 The model
We assume that individuals di⁄er in gender. There is a mass one of men as well as of women.
Individuals live for two periods. All men and some (we become clearer on this point later on)
women work in the ￿rst period of their life and retire in the second one. The ￿rst period is of
length 1 while the length of the second period di⁄ers for men and women: ￿m = 1 for men and
￿f = ￿ for women, with ￿ ￿ 1. In addition to the di⁄erence in longevity, men and women with
the same productivity w, have di⁄erent wages: !m = w for men and !f = ￿w for women with
￿ ￿ 1. For the time being, we do not specify any speci￿c productivity distribution w, only that
it is distributed over an interval [w
ﬂ
; ￿ w]. In Section 4, we assume successively a discrete and a
continuous distribution of productivity.
The structure of the society is such that it is only composed of couples, in which the husband
always works and the wife does not necessarily do so.8 We also assume positive assortative
mating: a man with productivity (and thus wage) equal to w always marries a woman who has
the same productivity, w (and thus, a wage equal to ￿w).9
Let us now de￿ne the intertemporal utility of couples, which is likely to depend on whether
one or both members of the couple work. In both cases, however, we assume that it is quasi-
linear (linear in the ￿rst-period consumption). This is undoubtedly a strong assumption as it
assumes away income e⁄ects but it is needed to obtain clear results. If the couple comprises two
breadwinners, their joint intertemporal utility is represented by
Uc2 (c;lf;lm;d) = 2c ￿ v (lf) ￿ v (lm) + (￿f + ￿m)u(d) ￿ k (1)
where c and d denote the ￿rst- and second-period consumptions, respectively. Second-period
utility function u(:) is such that u0 (:) > 0 and u00 (:) < 0. The labour supply is denoted li
and for simplicity, we assume that the disutility of labour v (li) is quadratic and equal to l2
i=2
for both genders i = f;m. Moreover, in a couple where both members work, the couple also
incurs a constant utility cost, k which can be regarded as the value of housework (the reservation
wage).10 Note also that our speci￿cation implies a unitary decision making within the couple.
8This assumption is made for simplicity. Adding also single individuals would not change our conclusions. In
a subsequent work, we plan to make marriage endogeneous in the same way as wife￿ s labor participation is made
here endogeneous.
9The papers of Mare (1991), Pencavel (1998) and Qian (1998) ￿nd strong evidence of positive assortative
mating with respect to education. Education can be regarded as a good proxy for income.
10We could have assumed that k depends on the couple￿ s productivity, w. We leave it for future work.
5This is at odds with a number of alternative household models, ranging from bargaining to
non-cooperative models.11
In the case where the couple comprises only one breadwinner, the lifetime utility is simply
Uc1 (c;lm;d) = 2c ￿ v (lm) + (￿f + ￿m)u(d) (2)
The utility function of a one-breadwinner couple di⁄ers from that of a two-breadwinner in
that the wife does not incur disutility of work and the couple does not support the forgone value
of housework k. Note that, if one member of the couple does not work, it is always the woman
as for the same productivity, she obtains a lower wage than her husband.
Let￿ s now turn to the de￿nition of the budget constraint. This will depend on whether
couples comprise one or two earners. Let ￿rst consider the intertemporal budget constraint of
a two-breadwinner couple. In this case, both members of the couple work, contribute to the
pension system, consume and save in the ￿rst period. In the second period, they retire and
receive a full pension bene￿t. Their budget constraint has thus the following form,
(!mlm + !flf)(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿mpm + ￿fpf ￿ 2c + (￿f + ￿m)d (3)
where, on the left-hand side, total resources comprise both members￿net income and their
pension bene￿ts, pi8i = m;f which they receive over a length ￿i. As we shall explain in
more details below, the tax rates ￿ and ￿ serve to ￿nance, respectively, the pension bene￿ts,
pi 8i = m;f and the derived rights, g. In our setting, even though a two-breadwinner couple
does not receive derived rights (i.e. g = 0 in the above constraint), he contributes to it. On
the right-hand side, total spending are made of ￿rst- and second-period consumptions for both
members of the couple.
Let now turn to the budget constraint of a one-breadwinner couple. It is slightly di⁄erent
from the two-breadwinner case and such that,
!mlm (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿fg + ￿mpm ￿ 2c + (￿f + ￿m)d (4)
Only the man in the couple pays taxes (for an amount !mlm (￿ + ￿)) and thus receives a pension
bene￿t, pm over a length ￿m. Nevertheless, the non-working wife, even though she did not
contribute to the pension system, receives a lump sum g over the length of her second period
of life, ￿f. This lump sum represents the "derived rights": a married woman will receive it,
11This would complicate the model and we believe that this would not change our main results.
6thanks to her marital situation. This supplementary pension bene￿t is designed as a way to
avoid poverty in these couples in which only one member of the couple was working and as a
way to avoid poverty of widows (since they receive it over a period ￿f > ￿m).
Let now de￿ne in details the pension system. If agents work, they contribute to a general
pension system for an amount ￿!ili. In exchange, they receive a full pension bene￿t over the
length of the second period of life, which depends on their gender and is such that,
￿mpm = ￿￿!mlm + ￿mb (5)
￿fpf = ￿￿!flf + ￿fb (6)
Here, the bene￿ts are partially contributive and the parameter ￿ > 0 gives the degree of contribu-
tiveness. The parameter b is a lump-sum pension bene￿t which does not depend on individuals￿
previous contributions. Hence, if ￿ = 0, the system is "purely Beveridgian" and individuals
receive the same lump sum independently of their previous contributions. The only di⁄erence is
that women receive more as they live longer (￿ > 1). On the contrary, if b = 0 or alternatively
￿ = 1, the system is "purely Bismarckian".12 In the case where b = 0, ￿mpm > ￿fpf as men
gross earnings, !mlm are higher than women earnings, !flf. As a consequence pm is de￿nitively
higher that the corresponding pf. It is important to observe that our pure Bismarckian system
provides bene￿ts that are longevity dependent, which is not the case of actual Bismarckian
systems but can be found in some notional accounts pensions.
In addition to the general pension system, non-working spouses receive a supplementary
bene￿t which is ￿nanced through additional taxation of all individuals in the society but redis-
tributed only to these women. Hence, all workers pay ￿!ili while working which is redistributed
to all non-working spouses, through a lump sum g over the length of their second period of life,
￿f. While the ￿ at bene￿t b is distributed to all retired workers, the derived bene￿t g concerns
only non-working retirees.
12To see this, we combine (5) and (6) with the revenue constraint made explicit below and we obtain:
(1 ￿ ￿)￿E [!mlm + !flf] = (￿m + ￿f)b
so that ￿ = 1 leads to b = 0.
73 Individuals decisions
3.1 Labour decisions
In this section, we characterize the individuals￿labour decisions taking the parameters of the
pension system (￿;￿;b;g) as given. If the couple comprises two earners, it solves the following
problem
max
c, d, lf, lm
Uc2 (c;d;lf;lm) = 2c ￿ l2
f=2 ￿ l2
m=2 + (￿m + ￿f)u(d) ￿ k (A)
s.t. (!mlm + !flf)(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿mpm + ￿fpf ￿ 2c + (￿f + ￿m)d
Replacing for the expressions of the pension bene￿ts (5) and (6), problem A is equivalent to
solving
max
c, d, lm, lf
(!mlm + !flf)(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿￿!mlm + ￿mb + ￿￿!flf + ￿fb
￿l2
f=2 ￿ l2
m=2 + (￿f + ￿m)[u(d) ￿ d] ￿ k
From the ￿rst order conditions, we obtain
u0 (d￿) = 1
l￿
m = w(1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿)
l￿
f = ￿w(1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿)
Hence the labour supply of individuals is distorted here for two reasons. First, individuals face a
net tax rate (1 ￿ ￿)￿ to ￿nance the pension system. We call it ￿net￿so as to emphasize the fact
that, in the second period, individuals get back a fraction of their earlier contributions, as the
system is partly contributive. Second, individuals face an additional tax rate ￿ which aims at
￿nancing the derived rights. Hence, if ￿ = 0 and if the system were purely contributive, that is
￿ = 1, the agent would not face any labour distortion. On the contrary, if ￿ = 0, the distortion
is maximum. For further use, we de￿ne the e⁄ective tax rate, te as
te = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿ (7)
To the extent that we take b as given and that the Bismarckian pension is identical to private
saving, what really matters is (1 ￿ ￿)￿ and not the values of ￿ and ￿.
8From this, the indirect utility function of a two-breadwinner couple with productivity w is
written as
V c2 (w;te;b) =
￿
1 + ￿2￿
w2 (1 ￿ te)
2
2
+ r + (1 + ￿)b ￿ k (8)
where r = (￿f + ￿m)(u(d￿) ￿ d￿) is constant given the quasi-linear utility assumption.




m=2 + (￿f + ￿m)u(d) (B)
s.t. !mlm (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿fg + ￿mpm ￿ 2c + (￿f + ￿m)d
In this case, only the working spouse contributes to the pension system and receives a pension
when retired but in supplement the non-working spouse receives a lump-sum subsidy g during
a retirement of length ￿f. Again, from the FOCs,
u0 (d￿) = 1
l￿
m = w(1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿) = w(1 ￿ te)
and we get the indirect utility function of a one-breadwinner couple, with productivity w:
V c1 (w;te;b;g) =
w2 (1 ￿ te)
2
2
+ b + ￿g + r (9)
3.2 Labour participation within the couple
We now turn to the choice of labor participation within the couple. The decision of whether one
or both members of the couple should be working is likely to depend on the value of housework,
k, on the disutility of labour supply and on the level of the wage ￿w which the couple has to
forgo if the wife is not working. It also depends on the features of the pension system, that is on
the ratio of contributions to payments and on the existence of derived rights, so that the return
obtained from the pension system is likely to be di⁄erent whether one or both spouses work.
To do so, we determine the productivity threshold ^ w that separates one-breadwinner and
two-breadwinner couples. This threshold is likely to be modi￿ed by the introduction of the
pension system and of derived pension rights. It is such that, at this level, the couples are
indi⁄erent between both working and incurring the cost k, or having a non-working spouse.
Hence, the threshold level ^ w is obtained by solving the equality V c1 ( ^ w;te;b;g) = V c2 ( ^ w;te;b).
Replacing for the expressions of the indirect utility functions, one obtains
￿2 ^ w2 (1 ￿ te)
2
2
+ ￿ (b ￿ g) ￿ k = 0 (10)
9When the solution is interior, ^ w ￿ w(te;b;g) is a function of the pension parameters and it is
implicitly de￿ned by the above equation. Hence, if the productivity of a couple is such that
w ￿ ^ w, both spouses work while if w ￿ ^ w, only the husband works. However, it may be the
case that the solution is never interior and that for any w 2 [w
ﬂ
; ￿ w] (even for the couple with
the smallest productivity, w
ﬂ
) V c1 (w;te;b;g) < V c2 (w;te;b) so that every couples in this society
comprise two breadwinners and ^ w !w
ﬂ
. On the other hand, it may also be the case, that for any
w 2 [w
ﬂ
; ￿ w] (even for the couple with the highest productivity, ￿ w), V c1 (w;te;b;g) > V c2 (w;te;b)
so that every couples are one-breadwinner couples and ^ w ! ￿ w; this latter case may arise for
instance, if the cost of house work, k is high.
3.3 The government budget constraint























On the left-hand side, a mass one of men contribute to the pension system, while only women
with productivity between [ ^ w; ￿ w] work and thus contribute. This implies that on the right-hand
side, every man receives the full pension bene￿t while only women with productivity between
[ ^ w; ￿ w] receive it. Non-working women, i.e. those with productivity [w
ﬂ
; ^ w] receive derived rights,
g. Recalling that the e⁄ective tax rate, te is de￿ned by (7), lm = w(1 ￿ te) and lf = ￿w(1 ￿ te),






















In equilibrium, the above equation holds with equality. Contrary to many models dealing with
pension design, the tax base (i.e. the expression inside parenthesis on the left-hand side) is not
￿xed as the labour participation decision and thus the threshold ^ w, depend on the features of
the pension system. Note also that this threshold also determines how much derived rights are
going to be distributed in the second period to non-working women. These are crucial points of
our model.
103.4 The Laissez Faire
In order to understand how the introduction of a pension system and of derived rights modi￿es
the equilibrium, let us ￿rst assume there is no government intervention and thus, no pension
system. In this case, individuals simply choose how much labour to supply and whether one or
both members of the couple should be working.
Substituting for ￿ = ￿ = pm = pf = 0, into (8) and (9), we obtain couples￿indirect utility
functions,
V 1c (w) =
w2
2









+ r ￿ k
where optimal labour supplies are not distorted and equal to individuals￿wage,
l￿
m = w and l￿
f = ￿w: (12)
From this, we turn to the choice of labor participation within the couple. This decision of
whether one or both members of the couple should be working now depends only on the value
of housework, k, on the disutility of labour supply and on the level of the wage ￿w which the
couple has to forgo if the wife is not working. Both wife and husband decide to work if their
joint utility is such that V 2c (w) ￿ V 1c (w) that is if





where w is the same for both members of a two-breadwinner couple as we assumed assortative
mating. On the contrary, if the productivity of a couple is such that w < ^ w, only the husband
works. There is indi⁄erence between being one- or two-breadwinner couples if the utility cost
of working for the wife, k, is just equal to the utility gain of such a move, namely (￿w)
2 =2.
This threshold ^ w is increasing in k and decreasing in the gender wage gap, ￿. Indeed, if the
reservation wage k is very high, the productivity level w must be very high for the two members
of a couple to be working. Similarly, if ￿ is very low, the potential gain for a woman working is
very low so that her productivity must be very high for her to accept working.
4 Optimal solution: ￿rst- and second-best
Even though our approach is mainly positive, it is worth looking at the optimal solution. To
do so, we assume that the social welfare function takes a general utilitarian form. We will
11consider successively the ￿rst-best solution and then the second-best solution, in which we use
the ￿scal instruments available to the social planner, (te;b;g; ^ w). We compare them with the
market equilibrium solution and this will give interesting benchmark for interpreting the voting
equilibrium.
We ￿rst study the ￿rst best assuming that the social welfare function is the sum of a concave

















with ￿0 > 0;￿00 < 0. From the ￿rst-order conditions, we obtain both (12) and (13) so that
the laissez-faire conditions on the segmentation between one-breadwinner and two-breadwinner
couples and on labour supplies are e¢ cient. Moreover, we obtain that
Uc1 (c;lm;d) = Uc2 (c;lf;lm;d)8w
which is a direct consequence of the quasi-linearity assumption. In this case, we obtain unitary
marginal utilities of income for all individuals. Hence, the optimum implies equal utilities
for all couples, independently of their productivity and of whether they comprise one or two
breadwinners.
This optimum can be decentralized with individualized lump-sum taxes and transfers, from
high-productivity toward low-productivity couples and from two-breadwinner toward one-breadwinner
couples.
This solution however cannot be achieved with our instruments so that we now study the
second-best framework, in which we assume that ￿scal instruments are the same as the ones we
consider in the voting process.
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te (1 ￿ te)￿2w2 ￿ (1 + ￿)b
￿
f (w)dw ￿ 0
13Without this transformation, there is no need for redistribution, with quasi-linear utility functions.

















f (w)dw = 0 (15)
From these formula, we see that g and b are there to equalize marginal utilities of one- and
























where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint. Note that the ￿rst
covariance in the numerator is de￿ned over the all interval; it is the covariance between marginal
utility of income and men￿ s gross earnings (independently of whether they belong to a one- or
a two-breadwinner couple). The second covariance is de￿ned only over the interval [ ^ w; ￿ w] and
is related to working women. The same distinction is made in the denominator for the average
square productivity. If there was no working women the second terms in the numerator and the
denominator would be zero and we would have the usual formula for linear income taxation.
The denominator of (16) is the standard e¢ ciency term as taxation creates distortions on the
labour supply. This e¢ ciency term depends on the cost of public funds, ￿ and on the derivative
of labour income with respect to the tax. With a quadratic labour disutility and a quasi linear
utility function, the derivative of the labour income with respect to te is ￿2(1 ￿ te)w2 for
men and ￿2(1 ￿ te)￿2w2 for women. On the contrary, the numerator is the standard equity










are negative, as the level of
earnings and the marginal utility are negatively correlated. If ￿(:) was linear, there would be
no redistributive objective and this term would cancel out.
5 The majority voting equilibrium
We now turn to the study of the voting equilibrium. In order to understand better the case in
which the productivity distribution is continuous, we will ￿rst start by solving a (more simple)
model in which the distribution of productivity is discrete. Only in the second part of this
section, we assume a continuous distribution of productivity.
In any case, we will assume the following timing. At time t = 0, the level of the ￿ at pension
bene￿t b is ￿xed at the constitutional level so as to satisfy a Rawlsian objective. This also
13implies that implicitly, the e⁄ective tax rate te will always be di⁄erent from zero (except if both
b = g = 0). At time t = 1, couples choose simultaneously their labour participation (whether to
be one- or two-breadwinner couples) and they vote over the level of derived rights g. As usual
in this type of problem, we proceed backward: couples ￿rst vote on the level of g for a given
level of b and decide to be one- or two-breadwinner and then, we determine the level b which
maximizes the social welfare function. This gives us the equilibrium outcome (t￿
e;g￿;b￿).14
5.1 Discrete distribution of productivity
5.1.1 Analytical solution
Let ￿rst assume 3 categories of couples, with productivity, w1 < w2 < w3. We assume that they
are in proportions, p1, p2 and p3 such that ￿3
i=1pi = 1 and that w2 ￿ E (w) (distributions are
either symmetric or right-skewed). For the moment, we assign no speci￿c values to pi and wi and
solve the general case. Only in the numerical example below, we assume di⁄erent distributions.
We also set that the couple with productivity w1 is always a one-breadwinner couple while the
couple with productivity w3 is always a two-breadwinner couple. As we have only three types,
the median-type-decisive voter is always the individual with productivity w2 so that the voting
outcome corresponds to his preferred policy platform, which of course, depends on whether he
is a one- or a two-breadwinner couple.
In order to solve the political equilibrium, we proceed in the following way. We ￿rst assume
that the median agent is a one-breadwinner couple and further that he is a two-breadwinner.
In each case, we derive his utility level under his preferred policy (since this is the equilibrium
outcome) for a given level of b; the solution corresponds to the case in which he obtains the
highest utility. Using a numerical example, we ￿nd the optimal level for the ￿ at bene￿t, which
maximizes the Rawlsian objective.
Let ￿rst assume that type-2 agent is a one-breadwinner couple. In this case, the budget
constraint of the government is such that15





￿ (1 + p3￿)b + ￿ (p1 + p2)g
14The way we proceed may not be the unique one. For instance, we could have as well assumed that the level
of derived rights, g are decided at the constitutional level while the ￿ at bene￿t b is decided by majority voting.
We could also have assumed sequential voting. This is left for future work.
15This budget constraint is equivalent to (11) except that, because we consider a discrete distribution of pro-
ductivity, the threshold ^ w disappears. This is implicit in assuming that w2 is either one- or two-breadwinner
couple. This simpli￿es a lot our computations and this allows us to obtain clear analytical results.
14where on the left-hand side of this equation, we have total contributions paid: all men contribute
to the system, for an amount te (1 ￿ te)Ew2 while only women from the highest productivity
group, contribute for an amount te (1 ￿ te)￿2w2
3. On the right-hand side, we have total bene￿ts
distributed: all men are working so that they receive b and only women with a high produc-
tivity work so that they receive a pension bene￿t b for a length ￿; non-working women, those
who belong to couples with productivity w1 and w2, receive derived rights, g over a length ￿.
Rearranging the above condition, we obtain the equation for the level of the derived pension
bene￿t, as a function of te and b:
g (te;b) =





￿ (1 + p3￿)b
￿ (p1 + p2)
Using this equation, we ￿nd the preferred tax rate of the median voter (i.e. a one-breadwinner
couple, with productivity w2). His indirect utility function is
V c1 (w2;te;b;g) =
w2
2 (1 ￿ te)
2
2
+ b + ￿g (te;b) + r
Note that we assume that the median agent vote on the level of te (and thus on the level of
derived rights) without considering that the choice of a speci￿c pension policy might change the
partition of the society between one-breadwinner and two-breadwinner couples. In other words,
he does not see the impact that the pension policy may have on type-1 and type-3 agents￿labour
participation decision (who may now prefer to be two- breadwinner couples or the reverse). He
takes this partition as given. Hence, his preferred tax rate is obtained from solving
max
te
V c1 (w2;te;b;g) =
w2



























2 (p1 + p2)
In case the median voter is a one-breadwinner couple, he will always vote for a tax rate greater
than the minimum one required to ￿nance the ￿ at bene￿t and thus he always prefer g￿ > 0.
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￿ (1 + p3￿)b
￿ (p1 + p2)
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(17)






p1+p2 , which makes impossible to have @V
c1 (w2;te;b;g)=@te < 0.
15Note that the equilibrium tax rate is independent of the level of b. The explanation is
straightforward: since the ￿ at bene￿t is ￿xed, an increase in the e⁄ective tax rate directly
increases the level of derived rights; individuals then choose the best trade-o⁄ between taxation
which create labour distortions and the level of derived rights they can obtain in return. We
also ￿nd that the level of derived rights, g￿ is always decreasing in b: for a given tax rate, an
increase in the ￿ at rate bene￿t given to all working agents has to be compensated by a decrease
in the level of the bene￿t toward non-working spouses, in order to keep the budget balanced.
Let now turn to the constitutional stage, in which b is ￿xed. If the poorest individual has a
zero productivity, he is a one-breadwinner couple and his income is simply (b + ￿g￿). Replacing
for the value of g￿, it is straightforward to show that this income is always decreasing in b. Hence,
at the constitutional level, it is optimal to set the ￿ at rate pension bene￿t to zero: b￿ = 0.17
Let now assume that the couple with median productivity w2 is a two-breadwinner couple.
In this case, his preferred tax rate is likely to be di⁄erent as well as the government budget
constraint. First, as he is a two-breadwinner couple, he would contribute to the derived rights
system, without receiving, so that he always prefers a zero level of derived rights. Since he is the
decisive voter, the voting equilibrium is characterized by g￿ = 0 and the equilibrium tax rate is
only determined by the government budget constraint.
This constraint is now modi￿ed; the structure of the society is di⁄erent as couples with
productivity w2 now comprise two earners and their desired level of derived rights is zero. The
budget constraint takes the following form:
te (1 ￿ te)
￿





￿ (1 + (p2 + p3)￿)b
where on the left-hand side, total contributions are made by a mass one of working-men and
women with productivity w2 and w3. On the right-hand side, pension bene￿ts are provided to
these agents who contributed in the previous period and no derived rights are given to non-
working spouses (g￿ = 0). Hence, the tax rate, tc2
e (b) that satis￿es the government budget












1 + (p2 + p3)￿
: (18)
17We would have obtained the same result if we had assumed that the productivity of the poorest individual
was non null, as t
￿
e is independent of b.
16We now ￿nd what should be the labour participation decision of the median voter (whether
it is a one- or a two-breadwinner couple). This, of course, will induce a di⁄erent political
equilibrium outcome.18
For a given b, if the median voter is a one-breadwinner, the political outcome is characterized
by (17) while if he is a two-breadwinner, the solution is given by (18) and g￿ = 0. Let de￿ne
the net utility obtained by the median voter from being a one-breadwinner and choosing his
preferred policy platform as ￿ = V c1 (w2;t￿






















+ ￿b ￿ k
!
(19)
where we used (8) and (9). If this di⁄erence is positive, the median voter chooses to be one
breadwinner which implies that at the voting equilibrium, derived rights are always positive and
the voting equilibrium is characterized by (17). On the contrary, if this di⁄erence is negative,
the median voter is a two-breadwinner couple so that he always prefers a zero level of derived







Let ￿nally make some comparative static analysis, and study in particular the factors that
in￿ uence the labour participation decision of the median voter. To do so, we consider the dif-
ferences in utility obtained by the median type from being one-breadwinner or two-breadwinner
using expression (19). First, note that independently from the case considered, the higher is
the cost of housework, the higher is the net utility, so that the more likely the median type is
a one-breadwinner couple. Indeed, unless the wage of the second earner (here the woman with
wage ￿w) is very high, a couple may prefer to be one-breadwinner and avoid a high cost k (and
eventually get some derived rights).
Let now see how these di⁄erences vary with the level of the ￿ at bene￿t. The e⁄ect is
ambiguous. On the one hand, the tax rate is increasing in b, since we should be on the increasing
part of the La⁄er curve: tc2
e (b) > 0 (recall that t￿
e and g￿ are independent of b), which increases
labour distortions. On the other hand, an increase in b makes more likely the median voter to be
a two-breadwinner (as he would get more resources from being a two-breadwinner couple). In
the following, we ￿nd the overall e⁄ect of an increase in b on the labour participation decision.
18The single-crossing condition de￿ned by Gans and Smart (1996) is e⁄ectively satis￿ed in our framework,
even though we have two subgroups in the popuplation. The marginal rate of substitution between te and g is
monotonically decreasing in w for one-breadwinner couples and two-breadwinner couples always prefer zero derived
rights. This guarantees that a political equilibrium exists under pure majority rule and that the Condorcet winner
is the preferred tax rate of the median productivity individual.
17In the next part, we assume speci￿c productivity distributions and ￿nd what should be the
level of b decided at the constitutional stage.
5.1.2 Numerical illustration
First, we assume that ￿ = 0:8 and ￿ = 1:2 . In France, it is estimated that women life expectancy
at 60 is 20% higher than that of men and that the pay gap is around 20%.19 In the following,
we study the political outcome under three types of distributions:
1. A centered distribution, with w1 = 0;w2 = 1;w3 = 2 with proportions p1 = p2 = p3 = 1=3.
In this case, E (w) = wm = 1 and Ew2 = 5=3.
2. A right-skewed distribution with w1 = 0;w2 = 3=4;w3 = 2 and proportions p1 = 2=9;p2 =
4=9;p3 = 3=9. In this case, wm = 3=4 < E (w) = 1 but E (w) is held constant with respect
to the previous example. We also have that Ew2 = 19=12.
3. A centered distribution, with equalizing transfers which are mean preserving.20 We assume
that w1 = 1=2;w2 = 1;w3 = 3=2 with proportions p1 = p2 = p3 = 1=3 so that E (w) =
wm = 1. In this case, Ew2 = 7=6.
Before going into the details of the simulations, we ￿rst have to de￿ne an interval for k,
which satis￿es our initial assumptions that type-1 agents are one-breadwinner and type-2 agents
are two-breadwinner couples. For distributions 1 and 2, one needs to have, in the laissez-faire,
that
V c1 (w1) ￿ V c2 (w1) , k ￿ 0
V c2 (w3) ￿ V c1 (w3) , k ￿ 1:28
By the same procedure, we ￿nd that in distribution 3, k 2 [0:08;0:72]. Also, as a benchmark case,
we ￿nd that, in the laissez-faire, the median voter would be indi⁄erent between being one- or
two-breadwinner if k = 0:32;0:18 and 0:32 for the three distributions respectively. Hence for any
smaller (resp. higher) level of k, the median voter is a two-breadwinner (resp. one-breadwinner)
couple, in the laissez-faire. Note that these conditions are equivalent to the continuous case
condition (13).
19Figures are taken from the French National Institute of Statistics, INSEE (See www.insee.fr).
20On this type of distribution, see Atkinson (1983).
18b 0 0.1 0.125 0.173 0.2 0.3 0.40
k = 0
￿ 0.269 0.051 0 -0.155 -0.337 !-0.425
t￿
e 0.42 0.42 0.42 - - -
tc2
e (b) - - 0.089 0.16 0.27 !0.5
g￿ 0.77 0.59 0.55 0 0 0
￿g￿ + b = (1 + ￿)b 0.924 / 0 0.808 / 0.22 0.785 / 0.275 0.2 / 0.44 0.3 / 0.66 !0.4 / 0.88
k = 0:1
￿ 0.369 0.151 0 -0.055 -0.237 !-0.325
t￿
e 0.42 0.42 0.42 - - -
tc2
e (b) - 0.13 0.16 0.27 !0.5
g￿ 0.77 0.59 0.47 0 0 0
￿g￿ + b = (1 + ￿)b 0.924 / 0 0.808 / 0.22 0.737 / 0.38 0.2 / 0.44 0.3 / 0.66 !0.4 / 0.88
Table 1: Political equilibrium outcome under distribution 1.
Results for distribution 1 are provided in Table 1.21
Since, in the above example, we set k < 0:32 in the laissez-faire the median agent would be
a two breadwinner. The introduction of a pension system and of derived rights (whose level are
determined by voting) su¢ ces to change the labour participation decision of the median voter.
Indeed, we ￿nd that, for b 2 [0;0:125] when k = 0 (or b 2 [0;0:173] when k = 0:1), ￿ ￿ 0 so that
the median voter now prefers to be one-breadwinner and to bene￿t from derived rights. Only
for b > 0:125 (or 0:173), the median voter prefers to comprise two breadwinners. In this case,
the net gain from being a two-breadwinner couple (i.e. an additional full pension bene￿t net of
taxes on the second earner and of housework cost) exceeds the net bene￿t to be one breadwinner
(i.e. the derived rights). We also insert a row, ￿g￿ +b, which corresponds to the income earned
by the poorest agent.22 The level of b chosen by the Rawlsian planner will be such that ￿g￿ +b
is maximum. From this table, it is clear that at the constitutional level, b will be set to zero
and equilibrium values are taken from the ￿rst column, (t￿;b;g￿) = (0:42;0;0:77), which are
independent of the level of k.
We also checked that this result is robust by introducing a last row with the values of (1 + ￿)b,
which represents the amount that a low-productivity individual would obtain from the pension
system if he belonged to a two-breadwinner couple. Indeed for b < 0:125 (resp. 0:173), the
poorest individual has always interest in being a one breadwinner as (1 + ￿)b￿k < b+￿g. On
21Note that the level of b is constrained by the fact that we remain on the good side of the La⁄er curve.






￿ + r where r is a constant, set to 0 for simplicity.
19Distribution 2 b 0 0.1 0.2 0.21 0.25 0.3 0.34
k = 0 ￿ 0.528 0.270 0.021 0 -0.203 !-0.245
t￿
e 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 - -
tc2
e (b) - - - 0.19 0.336 ! 0:5
g￿ 0.76 0.58 0.41 0.39 0 0
￿g￿ + b 0.907 0.797 0.687 0.678 0.3 0.34
k = 0:1 ￿ 0.628 0.370 0.121 0 -0.102 ! ￿0.146
t￿
e 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 - -
tc2
e (b) - - - 0.25 0.336 ! 0:5
g￿ 0.76 0.58 0.41 0.32 0
￿g￿ + b 0.907 0.797 0.687 0.634 0.3 0.34
Table 2: Political equilibrium outcome under distribution 2.
the contrary, for b > 0:125 (resp. 0:173), a type-1 couple would obtain a higher utility if both
members were working (and thus receiving a double pension) than if only the man were working
(and receiving one full pension plus derived rights), as (1 + ￿)b￿k > b+￿g. Yet, the utility from
being a two breadwinner in that case is still always lower than the one of being one breadwinner
at the political equilibrium (t￿;b;g￿) = (0:42;0;0:77). Hence the political equilibrium outcome
is robust.
We now consider a more realistic distribution, with wm < E (w) in Table 2.23
This does not modify substantially our results, except that the switch from one- to two-
breadwinner couples now arises at a higher level of b. Hence under a more realistic productivity
distribution, the political equilibrium is still characterized by positive levels of derived rights
and a zero ￿ at rate bene￿t: (t￿;b;g￿) = (0:458;0;0:756).24
We ￿nally study the equilibrium in the case of the last productivity distribution. Our results
are reported in Table 3.
In this last case, the Rawlsian social planner will consider V c1 (w1;t￿;b;g￿) where t￿ takes
either the value t￿
e or tc2
e (b) rather than ￿g￿ + b, as under distribution 3, the poorest individual
has a productivity di⁄erent from zero, so that the tax rate will also a⁄ect his utility, through
labour distortions. Note also that, when ￿ = 0, both political equilibrium are possible so
that the ￿rst value in * gives the utility level V c1 (w1;t￿;b;g￿) in case the political outcome
is t￿ = t￿
e and g￿ 6= 0 while the second one gives the utility level in case the outcome is
t￿ = tc2
e (b) and g￿ = 0. From this table, we ￿nd that the political equilibrium should be such
23Note that the level of b is constrained by the fact that we remain on the good side of the La⁄er curve.
24We checked that these results are robust.
20b 0 0.032 0.05 0.095 0.1 0.2 0.26
k = 0:1
￿ 0.054 0 -0.029 -0.107 -0.231 !-0.1874
t￿
e 0.373 0.373 - - - -
tc2
e (b) - 0.032 0.051 0.108 0.2624 ! 0:5
g￿ 0.481 0.425 0 0 0 0
V c1 (w1;t￿;b;g￿) 0.63 *0.59 / 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.27 !0.29
k = 0:2
￿ 0.154 0.070 0 -0.007 -0.131 !-0.0874
t￿
e 0.373 0.373 0.373 - - -
tc2
e (b) - - 0.102 0.108 0.262 ! 0:5
g￿ 0.481 0.393 0.315 0 0 0
V c1 (w1;t￿;b;g￿) 0.63 0.57 *0.52 / 0.20 0.20 0.27 !0.29
Table 3: Political equilibrium outcome under distribution 3
that (t￿
e;b;g￿) = (0:373;0;0:481) for any value of k, as with b = 0, the utility of the poorest
individual is maximized.
In unreported simulations, we checked that this equilibrium is robust. For b ￿ 0:032 (resp.
￿ 0:095), type-1 agents are always better-o⁄ being one- breadwinner than two-breadwinner, i.e.
V c2 (w1;t￿
e (b);b) ￿ V c1 (w1;t￿
e;b;g￿). Moreover, we have checked that, for any value of k, for
b > 0:032 (or b > 0:095), type-1 couples would obtain higher utility from being a two-breadwinner









in such a case, the utility of being two-breadwinner is always lower than at the political equi-
librium (t￿;b;g￿) = (0:373;0;0:481).
Finally, it should be mentioned that, for any distribution, the equilibrium outcome is in-
variant to the level of k. The only di⁄erence is that the higher is k, the higher is ￿ and the
more likely it is that the median voter is one breadwinner. This con￿rms our analytical results.
These three tables also clearly show that, taking into account both direct and indirect (through
the level of taxation) impacts of b on the di⁄erences in utility ￿, it is always decreasing in the
￿ at bene￿t. Hence, the higher is b, the smaller is g and the more likely the median voter is a
two-breadwinner couple.
5.2 Continuous productivity distribution
Let now turn to an alternative model, in which the distribution of productivity is continuous.
The crucial di⁄erence with the previous model is that, we now have to make use of ^ w as de￿ned
21by equation (10) so as to ￿nd whether the median type, wm is a one- or two-breadwinner couple,
i.e. whether wm 7 ^ w as it is clear from Section 3.2.25 However, as equation (10) shows, the
threshold productivity is endogenous and depends itself on the pension system instruments.
Hence, in order to simplify the model and to be able to get some analytical conclusions,
we will make the assumption that w is uniformly distributed over [0;1].26 This simpli￿es a lot
our model as ^ w de￿ned by (10) will also give the number of couples which comprise only one
breadwinner. This assumption is standard in models of mobility and of occupational choice.
Under a uniform productivity distribution, the government budget constraint (11) has the
following form:
te (1 ￿ te)
1 + ￿2 ￿
1 ￿ ^ w3￿
3
￿ b(1 + ￿ (1 ￿ ^ w)) + ￿g ^ w (20)
The timing of the model is the same as before, so that we proceed in the same way. First
we determine the preferred tax rate of the median voter couple and his labour participation
decision, for a given level of b. Given our assumption of a uniform distribution of productivity,
the median voter will always be the individual with productivity, wm = 1=2. Once knowing his
preferred policy platform, which also gives the political outcome, we ￿nd the level of b which
maximizes the utility of the poorest couple, that with w = 0.
5.2.1 Median voter preferred tax rate and labour participation decision
First, we determine the median voter￿ s preference for the tax rate or equivalently his preference
for a given level of derived rights, which depends on his labour participation decision.
We also assume that agents do not see the impact that the choice of a speci￿c tax rate and of
derived rights has on the partition between one- and two-breadwinner couples. In other words,
they take ^ w as given and they do not consider a general equilibrium model in which ^ w e⁄ectively
depends on pension parameters (as it is clear from equation 13).
Let ￿rst assume that the median voter is a two-breadwinner couple. His problem consists in
maximizing his indirect utility (8) in which w = 1=2 subject to the government budget constraint
(20). As before, this couple votes for g = 0 . Hence, the e⁄ective tax rate is implicitly de￿ned
25In the discrete type distribution, such a threshold did not appear as we were making assumptions on k so as
to ensure that w1- couple was a one breadwinner couple and w3- couple was a two-breadwinner couple. Only for
the median type couple, his labour decision was unclear, so that we were assuming successively that he was one-
or two-breadwinner and solving the model accordingly.
26A more realistic assumption would be to consider a right-skewed distribution or a distribution de￿ned on a
di⁄erent interval [x;1] with x > 0. As we showed in the discrete-productivity distribution, this does not change
substantially our results.
22by (20) in which g = 0:
te (b)(1 ￿ te (b))
1 + ￿2 ￿
1 ￿ ^ w3￿
3
= b(1 + ￿ (1 ￿ ^ w)) (21)
Note that in such a case, we need to have ^ w < 1=2 as by assumption, the median voter is a
two-breadwinner couple.
Let us now assume instead that the median voter is a one-breadwinner couple. In this case,
his problem amounts to maximize his utility (9) in which w = 1=2 subject to the government










^ w ￿ 1
4
;
te (1 ￿ te)
1+￿2(1￿ ^ w3)




where g￿ is obtained from solving (20) and one needs to have ^ w > 1=2. Note that, as it was
already the case in the discrete distribution example, the above solution for te is independent of
the level of b.
We now derive the labour participation decision of the median voter. We need here to resort
to simulations in order to ￿nd what will be the labour participation decision of the median voter.
To do so, let us distinguish two cases:
￿ Case 1: The median voter is a one-breadwinner couple with productivity such that wm =
1=2 < ^ w.















e (1 ￿ t￿
e)
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where ^ w is the solution to (10) replacing for (t￿
e;g￿).
Let now turn to the constitutional stage, in which b is ￿xed. The poorest individual has a
zero productivity so that he is a one-breadwinner couple and his income is simply (b + ￿g￿).
Replacing for the value of g￿, it is straightforward to show that this income is always decreasing
in b, if the threshold ^ w was assumed to be exogenous so that, in this case, it would be optimal
to set the ￿ at pension bene￿t to zero: b￿ = 0.28 Note however that in our simulations, we take






3 ^ w , with Ew
2 = 1=3 which makes impossible to have @V
c1 (1=2;te;b;g)=@te < 0.
28We would have obtained the same result if we had assumed that the productivity of the poorest individual
was non null, as t
￿
e is independent of b.
23into account that ^ w varies with b, so that typically, we will ￿nd that at the optimum, the tax
system is not entirely Bismarckian. To see that let us di⁄erentiate the income of the poorest




















The ￿rst two terms of the RHS are negative implying a pure Bismarckian system as in the
previous section. However the third term which cannot be signed without further restrictions
could lead to a positive value of b.








+ b + ￿g￿ + r
where t￿
e;g￿ and ^ w are obtained from solving a system of three equations-three unknowns.
￿ Case 2: The median voter is a two-breadwinner couple with productivity such that ^ w <
wm = 1=2.
In this case the political outcome is, for a given b, (t￿
e;g￿) = (te (b);0) with te (b), the solution
to (21) but where now 1=2 > ^ w and the threshold ^ w is again de￿ned by (10) where g￿ = 0. In
this case 2, the utility of the median two-breadwinner couple is
V c2 (1=2;te (b);b) =
￿
1 + ￿2￿
(1=4)(1 ￿ te (b))
2
2
+ (1 + ￿)b + r ￿ k
In order to ￿nd what is the labour participation decision of the median voter, we check,
in the simulations, whether these cases could be possible (under our assumptions on ^ w) and
we compare the utility levels he obtains under his preferred policy in each case. The political
outcome corresponds to the policy platform that gives him the highest utility level.29
Before going into the details of the simulations, let us mention that as in the discrete type
case, we keep ￿ = 0:8 and ￿ = 1:2 and r = 0. Under these assumptions, we ￿nd that, in the
laissez faire, ^ w = 1=2 if the cost of housework k is equal to 0:08. In other words, for this value, the
population would be equally segmented between one-breadwinner and two-breadwinner couples
29Since utility functions are the identical under a discrete and a continuum productivity distribution, we still
obtain that the single-crossing condition de￿ned by Gans and Smart (1996) is satis￿ed in our framework. Hence,
a political equilibrium exists under pure majority rule and the Condorcet winner is the preferred tax rate of the
median productivity individual.
24if there was no governmental intervention. In the following, this value k = 0:08 is going to be
used as a benchmark.
The following tables report the voting equilibrium outcomes assuming successively di⁄erent
values of k. In these tables, we report the preferred policy platform of the median voter (t￿
e;g￿)
which depends on his labour participation decision (whether 1=2 7 ^ w), for a given level of the
￿ at bene￿t.30 Given that the median individual is the decisive one, this is also the equilibrium
outcome. The last row in each table reports the utility of the poorest individual, V c1 (0;t￿
e;b;g￿).
Since the Rawlsian objective consists in maximizing the welfare of this agent, the social planner
will choose the level of b that gives the highest utility level to this individual.31
Let us ￿rst study the case in which k = 0:08 (Table 4). For this value at the laissez-faire,
the society would be equally divided between one- and two-breadwinner couples. We ￿nd that
the introduction of a pension system with derived rights has ambiguous e⁄ects, due to the
modi￿cation of the partition of the society. For instance, for a low level of b, we ￿nd that there
is now a majority of one-breadwinner couples, who would vote for a positive level of derived
rights. In such a case, the higher is b, the higher is the tax rate but the lower will be the level
of derived rights. Hence, when b increases, the number of two-breadwinner couples increases so
that we ￿nd that, for intermediate levels of b, there will now be a majority of two-breadwinner
couples who would prefer zero derived rights. Again, we ￿nd that increasing b increases the
tax rate and thus labour distortions so that, for a high level of b, a majority of couples will
again prefer to have a non-working spouse.32 Finally, we obtain that the level of the ￿ at bene￿t
that maximizes the utility of the poorest individual is b = 0:06 so that in equilibrium, the
policy platform chosen is (t￿
e;b￿;g￿) = (0:393;0:06;0:039). Hence contrary to the discrete type
distribution, it should not be always the case that the ￿ at bene￿t is null, in order to maximize
the utility of the worst-o⁄.
It is also the case that compared to the laissez-faire situation, which is a ￿rst-best outcome,
the political equilibrium outcome encourages more women to stay at home, since we ￿nd that
30In unreported simulations, we computed the solutions under the two cases for di⁄erent values of b and k. It
happened that for each value of b, only one solution was always possible (for instance, the other did not fall into
the intervals).
31As in the discrete case, it may happen that the poorest-one-breadwinner couple, would have interest in









￿. However, it is always less than what this couple obtains
at the Rawlsian solution, being a one-breadwinner couple.
32Our interval for b is limited by the pic of the La⁄er curve.
25b 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07
t￿
e 0.263 0.283 0.303 0.324 0.155 0.214 0.393 0.430
g￿ 0.063 0.060 0.057 0.053 0 0 0.039 0.026
^ w 0.94 0.92 0.89 0.86 0.37 0.32 0.68 0.51
Median Voter 1bw 1bw 1bw 1bw 2bw 2bw 1bw 1bw
V c1 (1=2;t￿
e;b;g￿) 0.143 0.146 0.149 0.151 - - 0.152 0.142
V c2 (1=2;te (b);b) - - - - 0.154 0.157 - -
V c1 (0;t￿
e;b;g￿) 0.0756 0:082 0.088 0.094 0.04 0.05 0.107 0.101
Table 4: Political equilibrium outcome for k=0.08.
b 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.075
t￿
e 0.246 0.266 0.286 0.307 0.328 0.351 0.375 0.406 0.48
g￿ 0.057 0.054 0.051 0.047 0.0436 0.039 0.033 0.024 0
^ w 0.96 0.94 0.917 0.89 0.85 0.80 0.74 0.63 0.34
Median Voter 1bw 1bw 1bw 1bw 1bw 1bw 1bw 1bw 2bw
V c1 (1=2;t￿
e;b;g￿) 0.140 0.142 0.145 0.147 0.149 0.149 0.148 0.143
V c2 (1=2;te (b);b) - - - - - - - - 0.120
V c1 (0;t￿
e;b;g￿) 0.068 0.068 0.812 0.086 0.092 0.097 0.100 0.099 0.075
Table 5: Political equilibrium outcome for k=0.10.
^ w = 0:68.
In the following two tables, we study cases in which k > 0:08, so that, under the laissez-faire,
there is a majority of one-breadwinner couples.33 We ￿nd that, for any value of b (except if
it is very high and close to the pic of the La⁄er curve), there should be a majority of one-
breadwinner couples. Hence the introduction of a pension system with derived rights increases
the number of one-breadwinner couples with respect to the laissez-faire. Yet, as soon as the
level of the pension bene￿t increases, the tax rate increases and derived rights decrease, so that
the advantage obtained from the pension system of being a one-breadwinner decreases. This
is why, for a high level of b and a high level of the tax rate, we should observe a majority of
two-breadwinner couples in the society, who would prefer zero derived rights. Again we ￿nd that
the utility of the poorest individual is maximized at b = 0:06 so that the political equilibrium is
characterized by (t￿
e;b￿;g￿) = (0:375;0:06;0:033).
Assuming that k = 0:12, we ￿nd that the political outcome should now be such that
(t￿
e;b￿;g￿) = (0:358;0:06;0:028).
From these three tables, it is clear that the higher is the cost of housework, the smaller are the
33In the laissez-faire, ^ w = 0:56 for k = 0:1 and ^ w = 0:61 for k = 0:12.
26b 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
t￿
e 0.228 0.248 0.269 0.289 0.311 0.334 0.358 0.385 0.445
g￿ 0.052 0.049 0.046 0.042 0.038 0.034 0.028 0.02 0
^ w 0.978 0.960 0.938 0.912 0.88 0.84 0.79 0.70 0.49
Median Voter 1bw 1bw 1bw 1bw 1bw 1bw 1bw 1bw 2bw
V c1 (1=2;t￿
e;b;g￿) 0.137 0.139 0.142 0.144 0.145 0.146 0.145 0.141
V c2 (1=2;te (b);b) - - - - - - - - 0.119
V c1 (0;t￿
e;b;g￿) 0.062 0.069 0.075 0.080 0.086 0.091 0.094 0.094 0.08
Table 6: Political equilibrium outcome for k=0.12.
equilibrium tax rate and the level of derived rights, for an equal level of pension bene￿t. Finally,
we also ￿nd, from these tables, that the introduction of a pension system always increases the
number of one-breadwinner couples with respect to the e¢ cient laissez-faire situation. Logically,
this number also increases with the cost of housework.
6 Conclusion
Derived pension rights are pension entitlements which are not earned as the result of a worker￿ s
own contributions and earnings history but based on a family relationship, typically the rela-
tionship between a husband and wife. Bene￿ts resulting from derived rights encompass spousal
bene￿ts as a supplement to a worker￿ s pension, bene￿ts for divorced spouses, and survivor ben-
e￿ts for widows. They contribute to alleviate poverty in old age for women living alone. Despite
their ￿nancial weight in total pension expenditure, derived pension rights have not yet been
studied from a theoretical viewpoint.
This paper tries to ￿ll this gap by showing how to account for the existence of derived
pension rights from both a normative and a positive viewpoint. We show that in a society
with individuals di⁄ering in their productivity and the type of couple they live in, a pension
system with positive derived rights is likely to emerge. In order to increase the redistribution
toward the poorest couples, it is desirable to increase the level of these derived rights and to
have a Social Security system as contributive as possible. This positive level of derived rights
leads to having more stay-at-home wives, so that we show an unavoidable con￿ ict between two
objectives: poverty alleviation and individualization of pension rights that seeks to foster female
labor participation.
Still, our paper makes some assumptions in order to make the problem tractable. Some of
27them may not be crucial, like, for instance, assuming that the cost of housework is indepen-
dent of agents￿productivity. Some others may certainly be more important. For instance, the
quasi-linearity of the utility function is made here for simplicity but it has some non negligible
consequences as one- or two-breadwinner couples have the same second-period consumption, in-
dependently of their productivity. Furthermore, we assume that inside couples, there is an equal
bargaining power, while this may not be the case in reality. Speci￿cally, it may be reasonable to
assume that, in one-breadwinner couples, the working spouse may have higher bargaining power.
Finally, we assume that derived rights are chosen by voting while the level of the ￿ at pension
bene￿t is chosen at the constitutional level. Alternatively we could have assumed sequential
voting or that derived rights are ￿xed by the constitution while individuals vote on the level of
the ￿ at bene￿t. This certainly in￿ uences our results.
Finally, our paper could be extended in several ways. A direct extension would be to make
the decision of marriage endogenous so that it would certainly depend on pension parameters. In
this model, we would assume a society composed of singles, one- and two-breadwinner couples.
This is on our research agenda.
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A Second-best solution
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30with ￿ the Lagrange multiplier associated to the ressource constraint. First-order conditions are
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where for simplicity, we drop the arguments in the expressions of indirect utility functions and
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Rearranging (22), and substituting for the above equalities, we obtain
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31The above function can be rewritten as
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which yields expression (16).
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